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SNEAKING THROUGH THE BACK DOOR WITH
PEPPERIDGE FARM: THE MONOPOLY ADVANTAGE OF
DILUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
McDonalds' golden arches, Coca-Cola's dynamic ribbon, Nike's
"swoosh" and Rolex's crown are such well-known trademarks ("marks")
that they indisputably receive national recognition. However, should the
same recognition extend to an orange, bite-sized, cheddar-cheese-flavored
cracker shaped like a goldfish?
The protection of shapes stems from the fact consumers mentally
associate particular shapes with a specific manufacturer or service.' To
gain exclusive rights over a particular three-dimensional design under
federal law, owners must satisfy stringent criteria. However, courts have
been particularly lax in applying the requirements.3 As a result, a fish-
shaped, orange, bite-sized, cheddar-cheese-flavored cracker may well
become the legal property of Pepperidge Farm.4
Traditionally, trademark law has not granted trademark owners the
exclusive rights over the design or shape of their marks.5 Commercial
monopolies over shapes and designs are generally left to patent law.6 Yet,
the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA")
7
1. See Ronald A. Panitch, Intellectual Property Law Overview, in TRADEMARKS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER AND THE
CORPORATE COUNSEL 1, 7 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 1999).
2. See id.
3. See Lucia Sitar, Comment, The Sky's the Limit? The Emergence of Building Trademarks,
103 DICK. L. REv. 821, 836 (1999).
4. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1999).
5. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3:2, at 3-3 (4th ed. 1999).
6. See Panitch, supra note 1, at 21. Two types of patents are utility and design. Id. at 20-
21. Utility patents generally grant exclusive rights to technological innovations for a maximum
of twenty years. See id. at 20-21; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 154(a)(2) (1994). However, some utility
patents may qualify for extended protection. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1994). Design patents
protect "new, original and ornamental designs" for fourteen years. See id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 173
(1994).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
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has greatly expanded the traditional functions of trademark law.8 Now, as
the far-reaching legal ramifications of the dilution theory have become
more apparent, heated debates among commentators have ensued. 9
Drifting away from traditional notions of trademark law, courts are
gravitating towards the unsettled doctrine of dilution.'0 Because of an
overbroad interpretation of dilution," some courts are improperly granting
permanent and nationwide injunctive relief to undeserving marks. 12 The
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. 13 is a perfect illustration.
This Note argues the Second Circuit in Nabisco incorrectly applied
the FTDA. Part II describes the trademark elements of distinctiveness and
fame in dilution cases, and traces judicial interpretation of dilution statutes
before and after the enactment of the FTDA. Part III reviews the Second
Circuit's rationale for preliminarily enjoining Nabisco from producing a
fish-shaped cracker. Part IV explains why the policies behind the FTDA
are inconsistent with the Nabisco decision and why the court should have
ruled differently. Finally, Part V concludes the Nabisco court's improper
application of the FTDA granted nationwide legal refuge to Pepperidge
Farm's "Goldfish," a trademark that does not merit such extensive
protection.
8. See Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 257-58 (1999).
9. See generally Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel,
Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 939-52 (1985);
Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute
Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433 (1994); Richard A. De Sevo, Antidilution Laws: The
Unresolved Dilemma of Preemption Under the Lanham Act, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 300 (1994).
10. See generally Steven B. Pokotilow & Heather L. Danzig, Whittling Away At Dilution:
Attorneys, Courts Mistake 'Confusion 'for 'Blurring,' N.Y. L.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at 1 (located in
special pullout section, "Intellectual Property").
11. See Leslie F. Brown, Note, Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
247, 265-66 (1999). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining
"dilution").
12. See generally Brown, supra note 11, at 251-65.
13. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Trademark Infringement Law
Trademarks identify the source (the manufacturer or merchant) of a
product or service. 14  They are used as a means of distinguishing one
owner's goods and services from those of another. 15 Trademarks prevent
consumers from confusing a product's origin and safeguard the trademark
owner's right to product association.' 6 They also assist in promotion and
sales 17 by functioning as a guarantee of consistent quality for all products
sold, or services rendered, under the mark.18 Examples of protected marks
include "OLD GRAND DAD bourbon, XEROX photocopier and LUVS
paper diapers."'19
Trademarks may consist of words, symbols, terms, phrases, labels,
devices, names, slogans, letters, pictures, numbers, the packaging of a
product or service marks.2 °  Under trademark infringement law, a
14. See Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution Act: Patent Medicine for Trademark Ailment?, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 8, 1996, at 1. Other goals of trademark include: 1) safeguarding a company's
reputation; 2) "protect[ing] firms from unjust enrichment [of] imitators;" 3) "facilitat[ing]
meaningful consumer choice in the market;" and 4) "encourag[ing] the production of high-quality
products." Mitchell M. Wong, Note, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law of Trade-
Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1123 (1998).
15. See Panitch, supra note 1, at 3. General trademark law in the United States "originated
with the medieval guilds of Europe, [which] often required members to identify their products to
facilitate the tracing of 'false' or defective wares .. " John M. McDermott, TRADEMARK LAW
2 (1997) (unpublished casebook on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
As the market for goods grew, contact between purchasers and the original manufacturer
diminished. Id. As a result, a guarantee of the source and quality of products became
increasingly important. Id. This led to the development of trademark law, which arose from state
and common law. Id. at 3. In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act, establishing the process
for bringing a federal trademark infringement claim. Id.
16. See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir.
1976); see also MDT Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1849, 1851 (C.D. Cal.
1994). See generally S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (General trademark law "protect[s] the
public['s]... confiden[ce]... in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it
favorably knows... [so as to] get the product which it asks for and wants to get").
17. See Oswald, supra note 8, at 255.
18. See Kenneth B. Germain, Trademark Law Fundamentals-For GPS and Corporate
Counsel, in TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION FOR THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER AND THE CORPORATE COUNSEL 25, 29 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 1999).
19. See id. at 28.
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998). By comparison, service marks identify the
source, not the type or nature, of a service. See Germain, supra note 18, at 28. Examples of
service marks include "MARTINIZING dry cleaning process, GREYHOUND bus lines, and
CENTURY 21 real estate services." Id.
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markholder may acquire protection for an indefinite duration2 1 against
harm caused by freeloading competitors who attempt to capitalize on the
goodwill of an established mark.22
1. Confusion
Trademark law shields the mark's owner from injury when someone
else uses a similar name, mark or other symbol in a manner that is likely to
cause consumer confusion.23 To prove trademark infringement under the
federal Lanham Act,24 a markholder must demonstrate the infringer's
actions would likely confuse the public as to the source of a product or
service.25
Until recently, federal protection of trademarks was limited to two
legal doctrines: trademark infringement and unfair competition.26 To gain
legal refuge under either claim, a trademark owner must prove the
trademark is valid and protectable and the infringer used a confusingly
similar mark.27
2. Distinctiveness
In order to succeed on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate the mark is "distinctive. '28 Distinctiveness is based on
the mark's "inherent strength or weakness., 29 A trademark is generally
placed into one of five hierarchical distinctiveness categories: generic,
21. See Moskin, supra note 14.
22. See id. at 4.
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
24. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
25. See id. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Likelihood of confusion refers to the "likelihood that an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply
confused, as to the source of the goods in question." Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods.
Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1812, 1816 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1984)). The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Somara Bros. Inc., No. 99-150, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2197 (Mar. 22, 2000), struck a resounding
blow to trademark owners. In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court held product design cannot be
inherently distinctive. Id. at *19. The Court ruled a product's design is protectable only upon a
showing of secondary meaning. Id. at *21.
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a).
27. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).
28. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir 1999).
29. Id.
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descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful. 30 The level of protection the
mark receives depends on its placement in one of the five categories.
Generic marks lie at the end of the distinctiveness spectrum and
generally are not protected. 31  They consist of words that identify a
commonly recognized class of goods.32 Examples of generic marks include
"piano," "trumpet" and "clarinet. 33 Otherwise protectable trademarks may
become generic if the term is assimilated into the everyday language of the
American public.34 This process, known as genericide,35 has claimed
marks such as "thermos" and "aspirin.,
36
Descriptive terms merely describe a product in some manner. They
do not "in their primary meaning, perform the essential trademark function
of identifying the source of products or services and distinguishing them
from the products or services of others." 37  Descriptive terms may gain
protection only after acquiring a "secondary meaning., 38  This requires
consumers to relate the product to a single source that does not need to be
identified.39  Examples of descriptive marks include AMERICAN
AIRLINES and CHAPSTICK lip balm, as well as personal names such as
30. Germain, supra note 18, at 30.
31. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215; see also Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1872) ("Nor can a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article
of trade or its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, be employed as a trade-mark [sic] and the
exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection.").
32. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); see also
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963).
33. See 1 JEROME GILsON, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE § 2:02, at 2-
13, 2-16 (1999).
34. King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 579.
35. See GILSON, supra note 33, § 2:02, at 2-17.
36. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996).
37. GILSON, supra note 33, § 2:03, at 2-58.
38. See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETmON LAW 125
(1991).
Secondary meaning exists only if a significant number of prospective purchasers
understand the term, when used in connection with a particular kind of good,
service, or business... as an indication of association with a particular, even if
anonymous, entity .... When a designation has become distinctive through the
acquisition of secondary meaning, it is protected under the same principles
applicable to inherently distinctive designations.
Id. at 124-25. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522 (1987) (finding the word "Olympic" had acquired secondary meaning); Filipino
Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
"Filipino Yellow Pages" was not a valid and protectable trademark with respect to a telephone
directory for the Filipino-American community because it had not acquired a secondary
meaning); International Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079 (7th
Cir. 1988).
39. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
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TAYLOR wine, FORD automobiles, and JOE'S BAR.40 Geographical
terms also fit into this category, for example, CINCINNATI INSURANCE,
and GEORGETOWN HOSPITAL.4
Generally, marks classified as suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful "are
per se inherently distinctive and entitled to protection under the Lanham
Act without proof of secondary meaning." 42 Suggestive marks give some
indication of a product's characteristics or qualities 43 and typically require
some degree of imagination. 4  Examples of suggestive marks are
GREYHOUND bus lines, COPPERTONE tanning lotion and FRESHER
COOKER restaurants.45 Whereas suggestive marks typically imply an
inherent characteristic of the product, arbitrary marks do not rationally link
a mark to its product.4 Examples of arbitrary marks are ARROW shirts
and DOMINO pizza.47 Finally, "fanciful" or "coined" marks are those
words invented solely for the purpose of being a trademark.48 Examples of
fanciful marks include KODAK film and KLEENEX tissues.49
Courts require a mark owner to prove three elements before granting
trademark protection. 50 First is the element of distinctiveness. Second, the
alleged infringer's mark must be the same as or deceptively similar to the
plaintiffs mark.51 Third, there must be a likelihood the defendant's mark
would confuse consumers as to its product's source.
5 2
Prior to the passage of the FTDA, some mark owners encountered
serious obstacles trying to satisfy the three pronged test for trademark
infringement. Particularly, established mark owners had difficulty proving
infringement against merchants and manufacturers who used the popularity
of the established mark to sell products unrelated to those the mark owner
sold.53 Proving the existence of either a competitive injury or a likelihood
40. Germain, supra note 18, at 30.
41. Id.
42. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Perlmutter Publ'g, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 578, 580 n.4
(N.D.N.Y. 1997).
43. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
44. See General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940).
45. Germain, supra note 18, at 30.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 779-80 (1992); see also Gruner
+ Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meridith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir. 1993).
51. See Gruner, 991 F.2d at 1075.
52. See id. at 1077.
53. See Moskin, supra note 14.
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of confusion between the products5 4 was extremely difficult.5  This
problem contributed to the rise in trademark dilution laws.
B. The Rise of Trademark Dilution Law
Although trademark infringement laws have provided guidelines and
remedies for the majority of infringement issues, they cannot provide relief
in all situations.5 6  Recognizing this problem, some states have enacted
anti-dilution statutes.57
However, because the dilution theory is conceptually vague, 58 the
cause of action has never been clearly formulated. Courts have been
consistently baffled regarding what specific legal interest dilution is
intended to protect and what specific harm it is designed to prevent.59 As a
result, dilution laws have been historically difficult to articulate and even
more troublesome to apply. 
°
Before the enactment of the FTDA, judges resisted imposing
injunctions beyond their state boundaries when applying state law because
only half of the states had dilution laws.61 This forced trademark owners to
bring suit in every state where their mark could be protected by a dilution
statute.62
With the FTDA, Congress intended to prevent non-owner use of
famous marks on non-competing goods.63 The Act began a conceptual
transformation of trademark law, which historically protected the mark
within its vertical market and protected the public from confusion.
64
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 856 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (quoting 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:13, at 213 (2d
ed. 1984)); 3 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:13, at 24-
124 to 24-126 (3d ed. 1996).
58. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 1999).
59. See id.
60. See Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Note, Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the
Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary Remedy, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 423, 426 (1998).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 104-370, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-
31.
62. See id.
63. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218. Buick aspirin, Schlitz varnish and Kodak pianos are
hypothetical cases of dilution advanced by the Legislature. See id.
64. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)
(explaining the law of unfair competition is rooted in the common law tort of deceit, which is
2000]
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However, the passage of a federal dilution law seems to indicate Congress'
interest in preserving the value of trademarks has surpassed that of
protecting the consumer.65
1. Dilution Law
The goal underlying protection from dilution was initially based on a
desire to protect trademark owners from those who attempted to
commercially use an established mark on a completely unrelated product.66
Around the 1920's, cases began to emerge where people alleged some form
of trademark dilution.
67
In the eighty years prior to the passage of the FTDA, only twenty-
eight states had enacted some form of anti-dilution law.68 Most dilution
statutes were based on the United States Trademark Association Model
State Trademark Bill6 9 and states without dilution statutes generally
followed a nebulous common law theory of dilution.70 Nevertheless, courts
continually grappled with structuring a functional definition for dilution.7'
As a result, no uniform set of guidelines emerged to help courts determine
concerned with protecting consumers from confusion); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETTION § 1, at 1-3 (2d ed. 1905).
65. See Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 60, at 425; see also Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enters.,
141 F.3d 886, 890 n.7 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Trademark infringement relief protects the public from
confusion by enforcing the rights of a prior mark, whereas dilution relief, being premised on the
absence of confusion, merely protects the property rights of the prior mark's owners.").
66. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 825 (1927). See generally Wall v. Rolls-Royce, 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925) (enjoining Rolls-
Royce Tube Company from using the name of the automobile manufacture Rolls-Royce to sell
radio tubes). See, e.g., Utah Div. of Travel, 170 F.3d 449; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b. (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
67. See generally Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co. 22 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1927); Ralston
Purina Co. v. Saniwax Paper Co., 26 F.2d 941 (V.D. Mich. 1928).
68. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 1295 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 155, 163 (1995) (statement of Jonathan E. Moskin, Partner, Pennie & Edmonds). But see 2
JEREMY GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.12[l][b], at 5-261 (1999) (stating
only twenty-five states had enacted anti-dilution statutes since 1947).
69. See UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12
(1964), reprinted in 4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:80, at 24-134 (4th ed. 1999). The Bill provides that the "likelihood of injury
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark shall be a ground for
injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of
confusion as to the source of goods or services." Id.
70. See Moskin, supra note 14.
71. See id.
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whether a mark was both distinctive and famous enough to gain protection
under dilution law.7z
Few courts were able to formulate a definition for dilution.73 Those
that did, defined dilution as the use of a mark by someone other than the
owner such that the use progressively erodes the mark's distinctiveness,
strength, and value.74  Even with a useable definition for dilution, some
courts still struggled with its application. These courts were unable to
settle whether consumer confusion should be required,75 how strong a mark
must be to be sufficiently famous 76 and whether an action could only be
brought against non-competitors in a dilution action.77 These courts feared
granting trademark owners the exclusive right to use a mark commercially
would hinder free competition.78 As a result, many courts resisted granting
72. See id.
73. See generally Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Tech., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir.
1987) (relying on 3A RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
& MONOPOLIES § 21.11 (4th ed. 1983) and 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:13 (A)-(C), at 212-219 (2d ed. 1984)).
74. See id.
75. Compare Astra Pharm. Prod. v. Beckman Instruments, 718 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir.
1983) (requiring a showing of consumer confusion), and Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahiti, 166 F.2d
348, 356 (9th Cir. 1948), and Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prod., Inc., 188 N.E. 30 (N.Y. 1933), with
Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd in relevant
part, 722 F.2d. 999 (2d Cir. 1983), and Olay Co. v. Cococare Prod., Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q.2d 1028
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring a showing of consumer confusion). See generally Beverly W.
Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, its Progress and
Prospects, 71 N.W. U. L. REv. 618, 619 (1976).
76. See, e.g., Westwood One, Inc., v. NBC, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q.2d 995 (C.D. Cal. 1982);
Mason Tackle Co. v. Victor United, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q.2d 197 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
77. See Robert D. Litowitz & Douglas A. Rettew, Cleansing and Clarifying the Mark, the
Year-Old Federal Trademark Dilution Act is Already Protecting Famous Marks from Blurring
and Tarnishment, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at 36; see also AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v.
Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 1993); Soloflex, Inc. v. Nordictrack, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
1721 (D. Or. 1994); Tower Publications, Inc. v. MTS, Inc., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1303, 1305 (N.D. I11.
1991); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Princeton Pharm. Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1447, 1454 (S.D. Fla.
1990). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 25 (incorporated dilution protection in
1993); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24:72, at 24-128 to 24-129 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining that, although the FTDA and the
Restatement apply dilution law to competing goods, this was not the original intention of dilution
law; at its inception, dilution law was exclusively reserved for noncompeting goods or services);
Julie Arthur Garcia, Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 489, 497-
500 (1995) (discussing state courts' application of dilution only to noncompeting products);
Beverly W. Pattishall, supra note 75, at 618-19 (explaining the annals of dilution can be traced
back to English, German, and United States case law, in which courts granted relief to trademark
owners of noncompeting products).
78. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 25 cmt. b (discussing the history of dilution
statutes).
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injunctive relief in the absence of possible consumer confusion. 79 These
courts generally heard, yet discounted, any claim of dilution.8°
a. Federal Trademark Dilution Act
Trademark owners who are unable to satisfy the requirements of a
trademark infringement claim can now find solace under a federal cause of
action theory of dilution.8' On January 16, 1996, Congress passed the
FTDA in order to protect famous trademarks from a gradual "whittling
away' 82 of the mark's distinctive quality.83  The FTDA amended the
Lanham Act by adding a federal cause of action for bringing dilution
claims, 84 and by defining dilution for purposes of the Lanham Act.85
Unfortunately, the federal statute did not succeed in supplying a uniform
standard of protection against dilution.86  In effect, the FTDA defines
dilution in a circular fashion.87 The Act does not specify how closely one
mark must resemble the other before dilution exists and provides little
evidence of what constitutes a famous mark.88  Consequently, courts, in
trying to interpret the Act's vague terms, have applied the statute
inconsistently.89
79. See 2 JEREMY GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.12[1][a], at 5-259
to 5-260 (1999).
80. See id.
81. See Lori Krafle-Jacobs, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 659, 660-62 (1998) (tracing the history of dilution).
82. Nabisco 191 F.3d at 214.
83. See generally id.; Mortellito v. Nina of Cal. Inc., 335 F. Supp 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(discussing the "whittling away" theory of dilution).
84. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub, L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998).
86. See id.; Moskin, supra note 14.
87. See Moskin, supra note 14. Dilution is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
88. See Moskin, supra note 14.
89. See id. Before passing the FTDA, problems with the Act were so apparent the statute's
author urged the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property to include a distinct
roadmap to determine when exactly a mark had been diluted. See id. However, the Legislature
did not enact the suggested guidelines. See id. The House of Representatives Report does not
shed any light on why the guidelines were not included. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
MONOPOLY ADVANTAGE OF DILUTION
b. State Law and the Federal Act
Congress derived much of the FTDA's language from preexisting
state dilution law. 90 The Act establishes a federal cause of action against
those individuals who dilute a mark's distinctiveness by trading on the
goodwill of famous trademarks. 91
However, the Act is unlike state dilution law because it only applies
to famous marks.92 By limiting protection to famous marks, the Act is
intended to extend protection only to an elite and limited category of
trademarks.93 Only those marks that warrant national protection due to
their enormous value and particular susceptibility to injury are beneficiaries
of the Act's protection.94 In cases where regional marks are so famous
"even non-competing uses can impinge on their value,"95 the legislature
explicitly states the federal dilution statute does not preempt state law.
96
90. See Moskin, supra note 14; see also McDermott, supra note 15, at 336. The language of
the FDTA and the reasons articulated in the statute for its enactment were taken almost entirely
from the Trademark Review Commission Report of the United States Trademark Association
(now the International Trademark Association). See United States Trademark Association
Trademark Review Commission, Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of
Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 455 (1987) [hereinafter Trademark Review Commission
Report]. When Congress enacted the FTDA, the states dilution statutes were: Alabama (ALA.
CODE § 8-12-17 (Supp. 1992)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1991)),
California (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1992)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 35-1 li(c) (West 1991)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp. 1990)), Florida
(FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West Supp. 1992)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (1991)),
Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (Supp. 1992)), Illinois (ILL. COMP. STAT. 1035/15 (1995)), Iowa
(IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1991)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2223.1 (West
1992)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1991)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 1 10B, § 12 (Supp. 1992)), Missouri (MO. REV. STAT. § 417.061(1) (1990)), Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1991)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1987)), New
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (Supp. 1991)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §
57-3-10 (Michie 1991)), New York (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1992)), Oregon
(OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1998)), Pennsylvania (54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West
Supp. 1992)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (Supp. 1991)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-512 (Supp. 1992)), Texas (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West 1992)),
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77 (West 1992)).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
93. See Trademark Review Commission Report, supra note 90, at 455.
94. See id.
95. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
It is important to note that the Act would not pre-empt existing state dilution
statutes. State laws could continue to be applied in cases involving locally
famous or distinctive marks. Unlike patent and copyright laws, federal
trademark law presently coexists with state trademark law, and it is to be
expected that a federal dilution statute should similarly coexist with state
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Thus, if state law permits, regionally celebrated trademarks may still
97receive protection.
According to the legislative history, the FTDA was designed to
protect famous trademarks from unauthorized uses of similar marks that
blur the distinctiveness or disparage the quality of the famous marks, even
if there is no likelihood of confusion.98 This theory of trademark protection
rests on the belief that a highly distinguished and recognizable mark is a
"powerful selling tool." 99 Furthermore, the Act was designed to prevent
the forum-shopping that resulted from having states with differing anti-
dilution statutes.10°
c. Definition of Dilution
The FTDA entitles the owner of a famous mark to injunctive relief
against a person who commercially uses, and thereby dilutes, the
distinctive quality of the owner's mark. 10' Dilution is defined as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception."' 1 2  The following product names
would exhibit dilution of famous marks: KODAK bicycles, DIES R US
machine shops, TIFFANY restaurants, 0 3  PEPSI in-line skates,
MICROSOFT lipstick, KLEENEX machine guns and JOCKEY automobile
tires.1 4 The current definition of dilution reflects Congress' belief that a
dilution law. The ownership of valid federal registration would act as a
complete bar to a dilution action brought under state law.
Id.
97. See id. at 3-4.
98. See Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998 (S.D.
Fla. 1997) (listing Congress' considerations when writing the act and not including likelihood of
confusion).
99. Nabisco 191 F.3d at 217 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 25 cmt. c).
100. See American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp.
204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 141 CONG. REC. H14317-18 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Moorhead)).
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
103. See Moskin, supra note 14.
104. See 2 JEREMY GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.12[1][a], at 5-
260 (1999); see also Hearing Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong. 15 (1932)
(statement of Frank I. Schechter) ("If you take Rolls Royce for instance, if you allow Rolls Royce
restaurants and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10
years you will not have a Rolls Royce mark any more.").
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measurable goodwill exists in the minds of consumers "subject to theft,
waste, or erosion"'10 5 when another party uses a mark similar to the owner's
trademark.'0 6
However, judicial interpretation of the federal statute has made clear
the legislature has left many vital questions unanswered. 0 7 In essence, the
confusion that arose out of fifty years of unevenly applied state law has
seeped into the porous framework of the federal statute." 8
According to the federal statute, dilution occurs when a famous mark
becomes less distinguishable as the identifier of specific goods or services
when another party is using a similar mark to identify its products or
services.' 9 Unlike infringement and unfair competition claims, trademark
dilution does not require the plaintiff to prove customer confusion,
deception or mistake, or the existence of competition between the famous
mark and the alleged diluting mark. 10
Instead, the FTDA establishes the following elements for a finding of
dilution: the plaintiffs mark is famous;11' "the defendant [makes]
commercial use of the mark in commerce; the defendant's use [began] after
the plaintiffs mark became famous; and the defendant's use presents a
likelihood of dilution of the distinctive value of the mark.
1 2
2. Fame: Stepping Beyond Distinctiveness
Congress realized granting dilution protection based merely on proof
of inherent or acquired distinctiveness would have the undesirable result of
protecting trademarks from potentially non-infringing uses. 113  Thus,
according to the FTDA, a trademark owner must prove the mark is not only
distinctive, but also famous.114 This limits the type of trademark afforded
dilution protection.' 5
105. Moskin, supra note 14.
106. See id.
107. For a thorough analysis of trademark issues the federal dilution law does not address,
see Moskin, supra note 14.
108. See Terry R. Bowen, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Does it Address the
Dilution Doctrine's Most Serious Problems?, 7 J. ART & ENT. LAW 75, 78-79 (1996).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
110. See Nabisco 191 F.3d at 215.
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
112. Avery Dennison 189 F.3d 868, 874 (citing Panavision Int'l. L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1))).
113. See id. at 875.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); see also Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 876. But see
Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding, in applying
the FTDA famousness factors, a mark proven distinctive will also be famous). Cf Films of
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Under the FTDA, "a mark [must] be truly prominent and
renowned."' 1 6  The FTDA provides a nonexclusive list of eight factors
courts may apply in determining whether a mark is famous.1 7  These
factors include: 1) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark; 2) the duration and extent of the mark's use in connection with the
goods or services it identifies; 3) the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark; 4) the geographical extent of the trading area in
which the mark is used; 5) the channels of trade for the goods or services
the mark identifies; 6) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading
areas and channels of trade used by both the mark's owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought; 7) the nature and extent of use of
the same or similar marks by third parties; and 8) whether the mark was
registered on the principal register." 8
a. Judicial Discord: No Clear Definition of Dilution
The FTDA's nonexclusive list of factors that determine fame is too
general to provide much guidance." 9 As a result, courts are unable to use
the factors to determine whether the plaintiffs have met the "higher
standard [that] must be employed to gauge the fame of a trademark eligible
for this extraordinary remedy....,120 Thus, even with Congress' attempt
to instill uniform understanding of dilution law by creating a list of factors
to determine fame, 12' courts continually grapple with the concept of
dilution. 122 This judicial discord has resulted in confusion and has led to
Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prod., Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 1068, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (noting
"trademark dilution laws protect 'distinctive' or 'famous' trademarks from certain unauthorized
uses" (quoting Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D. Cal 1996))).
115. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875.
116. Id. (citing I.P. Lund Trading APS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
118. See id.
119. See Moskin, supra note 14.
120. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 876 (citing 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 461 (1987));
Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 81, at 690 ("If all marks are distinctive, and a showing of
distinctiveness meets the elements of fame, what marks would be outside the protection of the
FTDA?... [T]he FTDA does not indicate that any particular degree of distinctiveness should end
the inquiry."); cf 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:109, at 24-211 to 24-214 (4th ed. 1999).
121. See 141 CONG. REc. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see
also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3; 141 CONG. REC. H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Moorhead).
122. See generally Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983).
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disparate interpretations of the Act. 23  The inconsistent standards were
evident in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 24 where Pepperidge Farm was
able to secure a preliminary injunction against Nabisco Brand Company
("Nabisco").
125
The intention of the federal statute was to limit anti-dilution
protection to a handful of celebrated marks.' 26 However, courts applying
the federal and state statutes have nonetheless extended this higher level of
protection to local favorites and relatively obscure companies. 27  Thus,
marks such as Tele Tech, Gazette, Intermatic, Nailtiques, Wawa and "Papal
Visit 1999" have been deemed famous. 128  In some cases, courts have
neglected the fame element entirely.
29
b. Blurring and Tarnishment
Under the FTDA, dilution may result from either blurring or
tamishment 30 Blurring occurs when an unauthorized use of an established
trademark diminishes its selling power.' 31  This happens when a junior
123. See generally Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-25. The Nabisco court explicitly declined to
follow Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), which interpreted the federal anti-dilution statute as requiring proof of
"actual, consummated harm." Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223. To prove dilution, the Ringling Bros.
court required the plaintiff "rely on evidence of 'actual loss of revenues' or the 'skillfully
constructed consumer survey."' Id. However, the Nabisco court found this to be "an arbitrary
and unwarranted limitation on the methods" of proving dilution. Id.
124. 191 F.3d 208.
125. See id. For purposes of this Note, Nabisco Brands Company and Nabisco, Inc. are
collectively known as "Nabisco."
126. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875.
127. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999).
128. See id. (citing Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., No.
4:99CV27SNL, 1999 WL 66022, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 1999)) opinion withdrawn (holding
"Papal Visit 1999" famous as a result of the Pope's visit to St. Louis)); Nailtiques, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1998-99 (holding "Pro-Techniques" diluted "Nailtiques" famous fingernail care product);
Teletech Customer Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (holding the name "TeleTech" was "probably famous" for a customer care information
service); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding
"Intermatic" famous for electrical products); Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1629, 1631
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding "Wawa" famous for convenience stores in surrounding states);
Wedgewood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 381 (Or. 1983) (holding "Wedgewood" famous
for a house building company in eastern Washington County, Oregon)).
129. See Lemley, supra note 127, at 1698-1699 & 1699 n.51.
130. See Nailtiques, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1998.
131. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
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mark so strongly resembles the famous mark132 consumers automatically
associate the two.1 33 On the other hand, tarnishment takes place when the
junior use causes the senior trademark to be associated with inferior quality
goods or an offensive or distasteful use.' 34  Trademark owners who
successfully prove the existence of either blurring or tarnishment may
receive injunctive relief against nearly all unauthorized uses of their
famous mark nationwide.1
35
c. Noncommercial Use
Non-commercial use is synonymous with non-trademark use of a
mark. 136 Under the FTDA, non-commercial use is an affirmative defense to
a claim of trademark dilution. 137  Non-commercial use exists when the
mark "do[es] not create an association with a different user's goods,
services, or business."'' 38 It occurs when the mark is not "used to advertise
or promote a product by suggesting inaccurate sponsorship or origin."'
' 39
d. Trade Dress
The dilution theory has perpetually seeped into the realm of trade
dress.' 4° Trade dress is the complete image of a product. ' 4' Trade dress
132. Junior marks are defined as those marks which have less recognition than senior marks,
usually because they are not first in time or stronger marks exist. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v.
Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129 n.3 (1998).
133. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1031 (holding no blurring resulted between
Toyota's LEXUS mark and the plaintiff's LEXIS mark because, due to the niche market and
sophistication of the LEXIS clientele, there was little likelihood a mental association between the
two would develop); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding "The Greatest Used Car Show on
Earth" blurred the Ringling Brothers' "The Greatest Show on Earth" due to the strong mental
association resulting between the two marks).
134. See Deere, 41 F.3d at 43; see, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. D.B. Rakow, 739 F. Supp.
116, 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (enjoining a comedian's use of the stage name "Kodak" because the
comedian's sexually and violently explicit humor would likely tarnish Eastman Kodak's
trademark). See generally Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp 836, 844 (D. Mass.
1964) (enjoining a restaurant's use of the plaintiff's famous jewelry trademark TIFFANY'S due
to the restaurant's inferior advertising of its product and lower quality of goods).
135. See Nailtiques, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995.
136. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 25 cmt. i.
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
138. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 25 cmt. i.
139. Natalie A. Dopson, Note, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and Its Effect on
Parody: No Laughing Matter, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 539, 562 (1998).
140. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1554 (S.D. Miss.
1996) (enjoining the use of the defendant's mixer under trade dress dilution because the
plaintiff's similarly designed stand mixer would otherwise be diluted). See generally Jennifer A.
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laws protect the product's features, including shape, size, colors, textures
and graphics.142  To successfully bring a trade dress claim, the plaintiff
must prove the trade dress is not principally functional and consumers link
the trade dress with a single source.
143
i. Functionality
Aspects of a mark are described as functional if they affect the value
or quality of the mark.' 44 Product features, such as color or shape, are
functional if they are considered "essential to effective competition."'
145
Functional features render products useful for reasons other than merely
identifying the product's source. 146 A finding of functionality precludes
trademark protection under the FTDA regardless of whether the feature
identifies the product's origin.
147
ii. Protecting Features
The rationale behind protecting a particular product feature, such as
shape or color, stems from the theory that consumers may associate a
particular look with a specific manufacturer, product or service. 148  If a
mental association is proven, the owner is said to have established a
secondary meaning in that particular feature. 149 As a result, the markholder
Van Kirk & Rosemarie Christofolo, Goldfish Cracker Case Upholds Emerging Claim, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at C24.
141. See Two Pesos 505 U.S. at 763-64, 764 n.1 (1992) (citing John H. Harland Co. v.
Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980(1lth Cir. 1983)).
142. See id. at 764 n.1.
143. See Van Kirk & Christofolo, supra note 140, at C24.
144. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). For an in depth
discussion of the functionality doctrine, see Wong, supra note 14, at 1116.
145. Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (1979).
146. See Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1994). The
Aromatique court held Aromatique's potpourri, packaged in pillow-shaped double cellophane
bags, closed with a red and/or gold and green cord tied with a square-knot, was functional and did
not establish secondary meaning. Id. at 870, 875.
147. See Van Kirk & Christofolo, supra note 140, at C24; Wong, supra note 14, at 1118.
The functionality limitation upon trade-dress protection is a judicial
expression of two basic policy considerations. First, the functionality
doctrine prevents suppliers of a product from monopolizing the indispensable
features of the product .... Second, the functionality bar prevents trade-dress
law from permanently securing designs that are more properly guarded by
transitory species of intellectual-property law, such as patents or copyrights.
Id.
148. See Panitch, supra note 1, at 7.
149. See id.
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may gain exclusive trademark protection over the feature. 50 However,
functional features-those features essential in producing the good
itself' 51-- can never receive trademark protection. 152 Doing so potentially
hinders competition by preventing others from producing similar
products.
53
In the past, dilution was rarely used to protect a product's three-
dimensional appearance. 154  Today, however, this is quickly changing as
more plaintiffs seek legal refuge for the shape of their products under a
trade dress dilution theory. 55
III. NABISCO, INC. V. PF BRANDS, INC.
A. Case Background
Pepperidge Farm, a division of Campbell Soup Company, 156 has
produced orange, goldfish-shaped, cheddar-cheese flavored crackers under
the name "Goldfish" since 1962.157 Since then, Pepperidge Farm has
secured trademark registrations for both the design and name of these
crackers. 58 From 1995 to 1998, the company launched a nationwide $120
million marketing campaign that more than doubled its net sales to $200
150. See id.
151. See id.; Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding the color black for outboard engines was not protectable because black has the
functional capacity to make objects look smaller); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, 271
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding use of the color pink for Pepto Bismol tablets was not
protectable because of pink's soothing appearance); Nor-Am Chemical v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co.,
4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding blue-colored fertilizer was not protectable
because using blue was essential to compete in the fertilizer industry). But see Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding green-gold pads for dry cleaning presses were
protectable because they had acquired secondary meaning); In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (1985) (holding no competitive need exists in using the color pink for home
insulation).
152. See Panitch, supra note 1, at 8.
153. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, at § 1 cmt. e ("[Tjhe protection of
trademarks must also be responsive to the public interest in fostering vigorous competition ....
In some cases, the recognition of exclusive rights in favor of a particular seller may... deprive
competitors of access to product features necessary for effective competition.").
154. See Lemley, supra note 129, at 1701.
155. See id.; see also I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding, in light of the Dilution Act's heightened standard for fame, Kohler's faucet
configuration was not "famous" enough to protect).
156. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Pepperidge Farm now makes Goldfish crackers in a variety of flavors. Id. at 192 n.1.
157. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1999).
158. See id.
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million per year.' 59 As a result, Goldfish is the number one selling cheese
snack cracker in dollars, and number two in volume. 60
In 1998, Nabisco entered a joint promotion agreement with
Nickelodeon Television Network ("Nickelodeon") 16 1 to produce cheese
crackers shaped like characters from Nickelodeon's new cartoon program,
CatDog.162  In accordance with the Nickelodeon agreement, Nabisco
developed three orange, cheddar-cheese flavored crackers based on the
CatDog show: the CatDog, bones and fish.16 3 Half of the crackers were in
the shape of the CatDog character; the other half were evenly split between
the bone shaped crackers and the goldfish-shaped crackers.' 64  In
comparison to Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish, the CatDog fish is "larger and
flatter and has markings on one side.' 65
Nabisco intended to launch the CatDog product in February 1999.166
However, after learning of Nabisco's plans, Pepperidge Farm requested
Nabisco not use the goldfish-shaped cracker in its CatDog product.'
67
Thus, Nabisco moved for a declaratory judgement against Pepperidge Farm
to protect its right to sell the crackers. 168 In response, Pepperidge Farm
alleged Nabisco's goldfish cracker infringed and diluted Pepperidge Farm's
trademarked Goldfish cracker under the FTDA and violated New York's
anti-dilution and unfair competition laws. 1
69
B. The District Court's Opinion
The district court held Nabisco's cracker would likely dilute
Pepperidge Farm's trademark and preliminarily enjoined Nabisco from
selling its CatDog goldfish cracker. 70 The court determined Pepperidge
159. Seeid. at 213.
160. See id.
161. See id. Nickelodeon is a subsidiary of Viacom International, Inc. See id.
162. See id. at 212. The CatDog show features a cartoon character with the head of a cat on
one end of its body and the head of a dog on the other end. See id. The Nickelodeon's CatDog
cartoon is one of the most widely watched children programs in the United States. See id. at 213.
163. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213. New York's anti-dilution statute is analogous to the
FTDA. Id. at 215 n.l.
170. See Nabisco, 50 F. Supp.2d at 212.
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Farm's Goldfish was distinctive and famous, and therefore protected under
the FTDA.'7 '
In determining Nabisco's goldfish cracker would likely dilute
Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish cracker, the court applied a six-prong test used
to determine violations of New York dilution law. 172  The district court
held, because all six factors weighed in favor of a finding of dilution,
Pepperidge Farm had proved it was likely to succeed on its dilution claims
under both federal and state law. 173 The court stated:
In essence, P[epperidge] F[arm] has taken a unique and
fanciful idea-creating a cheese cracker in the shape of a
goldfish-and turned it into its signature. Nabisco's inclusion
of this signature element as part of the CatDog product strikes
at the heart of what dilution law is intended to prevent: the
'gradual diminution or whittling away of the value of the
famous mark by blurring uses by others.' Over time, the
presence of Nabisco's goldfish-shaped cracker within the
CatDog mix is likely to weaken the focus of consumers on the
true source of the Goldfish.
174
Accordingly, the district court granted Pepperidge Farm's motion for
a preliminary injunction. 175 The court enjoined Nabisco from selling their
goldfish cracker and ordered Nabisco to recall all CatDog products that
contained the fish-shaped cracker until the court reached a final
judgement.
176
171. See Deborah Pines, Fish-Shaped Cracker Barred from Shelves, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 4, 1999,
at 1. The court noted confusion would be difficult to prove because Nabisco's goldfish was only
one of three shapes of crackers sold in the CatDog boxes. See id. See generally Nabisco, 50 F.
Supp. 2d at 188. Although the district court felt Pepperidge Farm would likely succeed on its
anti-dilution claim, the court denied Pepperidge Farm's trademark infringement claims on the
basis that Pepperidge Farm could not demonstrate actual consumer confusion. Id. at 210-11.
172. The six-prong test was proposed by Judge Sweet in his concurring opinion in Mead
Data Central, Inc., v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Sweet, J., concurring). This six-prong analysis for considering the likelihood of dilution
includes: 1) similarity of the marks; 2) similarity of the products covered by the marks; 3)
sophistication of consumers; 4) predatory intent; 5) renown of the senior mark; and 6) renown of
the junior mark. Id.
173. See Nabisco, 50 F. Supp.2d at 209-10.
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. See id. at 212. Because Nabisco offered compelling proof of damages it would suffer
from the injunction, the district court ordered Pepperidge Farm to post a $3.55 million bond. Id.
176. See id.
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C. The Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The issue on appeal was whether Nabisco's use of an orange, bite-
sized, cheddar cheese-flavored, goldfish-shaped cracker diluted the
distinctive quality of Pepperidge Farm's similarly designed Goldfish
cracker in violation of the FTDA. 177 In making its determination, the court
found the trademark owner is entitled to injunctive relief when five
essential elements are satisfied: 1) the senior mark must be famous; 2) the
mark must be distinctive; 3) the junior mark must be used for commercial
gain; 4) the junior mark's use must commence after the senior mark is
famous; and 5) the junior mark must dilute the distinctive quality of the
senior mark.1
78
According to the court, the first, third and fourth factors were
undisputed: Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish is a famous mark; Nabisco used
its goldfish cracker after Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish had become famous;
and Nabisco used its goldfish in commerce. 179 However, the court found
more extensive inquiry was required to make a determination on the
remaining factors: the junior mark's dilution of the senior mark and the
distinctiveness of the senior mark.18
0
In its discussion of distinctiveness, the court placed Pepperidge
Farm's Goldfish at neither end of the spectrum. 18' Rather, the court
decided the Goldfish's proper placement was somewhere in the middle,
deeming the Goldfish arbitrary. 182 The court explained Pepperidge Farm's
Goldfish was "reasonably distinctive" because no rational connection
existed between the fish shape and a cheese cracker.'
83
In its analysis, the court recognized children's cookies or crackers are
often made in animal shapes. 184 The court also acknowledged companies
other than Pepperidge Farm have marketed crackers in the shape of fish.
185
In fact, Nabisco itself had previously produced and sold goldfish-shaped
crackers under the name "Snorkels."' 186 However, the court discounted this
fact because Nabisco's "Snorkels" were unsuccessful in the marketplace.' 
87
177. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 214.
178. Seeid. at 215.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Seeid. at 216.
182. Seeid. at 217-18.
183. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 217-18.
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Second, the appellate court adopted factors that historically have been
reserved for determining the likelihood of consumer confusion in
traditional trademark infringement cases. 88  In its opinion, the court
considered the following elements: the senior mark's distinctiveness;
189
"the similarity of the marks;"' 90 the proximity of the two products in the
market;' 9' the interrelationship of the first three factors; 192 "shared
consumers and geographic limitations;' ' 93  "the sophistication of
consumers;' ' 194 "actual confusion;"' 95 adjectival association between the
junior use and the junior area of commerce; 196 "harm to the junior user and
delay by the senior user;"'197 and "the effect of senior's prior laxity in
protecting the mark."'198 After analyzing each element, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court's judgment and enjoined Nabisco from selling its
goldfish-shaped crackers. 199
IV. WHERE THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND NABISCO FAILED
The appellate court improperly applied the elements of dilution in
finding Nabisco's fish-shaped cracker diluted Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish
cracker. Moreover, the Second Circuit incorrectly found Nabisco's use of a
fish-shaped cracker was a trademark use.200 Finally, the court improperly
neglected to look at the importance of the defendant's intent in determining
when dilution exists.
188. See id. at 217 (observing that in trademark infringement cases, courts generally apply
the "nonexclusive list of factors" applied in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287
F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J., concurring)).
189. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
190. Id. at 218.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 219.
193. Id. at 220.
194. Id.
195. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 221.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 222.
198. See id. at 217.
199. See id. at 228-29. "Pepperidge Farm has demonstrated likelihood of success in
proving that Nabisco's use of its goldfish-shaped cheddar cheese cracker will dilute Pepperidge
Farm's... famous, goldfish-shaped cheddar cheese cracker" in violation of the FTDA, section
43(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998). Id.
200. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999).
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A. Distinctiveness and Fame
The Second Circuit categorized Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish as
moderate on the distinctiveness spectrum.20 1 The court found Pepperidge
Farm's Goldfish trademark moderately distinctive because its goldfish
shape had nothing in common with its existence as a cheese cracker.20 2
However, although a goldfish shape may be arbitrary when affixed to
virtually any product, the inelegant, uncreative and unclever shape itself is
generic. The shape of a goldfish is not indicative of any one source. It is
only when the word cracker follows the word goldfish there might be a
mental association among consumers that the product is manufactured by a
single source.
At most, the Goldfish cracker mark is descriptive. The name of the
product describes the good. The Goldfish cracker is a cracker, gold in
color and shaped like a fish. There is little arbitrariness about the product.
As discussed previously, 20 3 examples of arbitrary marks are such things as
Arrow shirts and Domino's pizza. However, there is a great distinction
between these latter two marks and the Goldfish cracker. The difference is
ARROW shirts are not shaped like arrows, and DOMINO pizzas are not
exclusively made in the shape of dominos. Thus, the Second Circuit
incorrectly labeled the Goldfish cracker arbitrary. If anything, it is
descriptive. Thus, to gain trademark protection, there must be a showing of
secondary meaning.
Nabisco should have argued neither the Goldfish name nor its three-
dimensional design ought to be included in the upper echelon of
prominently distinctive marks such as Marlboro, Coca-Cola, McDonald's,
IBM, Disney, Kodak, Kellogg's and Budweiser.204 The name describes the
product and there is no evidence of secondary meaning.20 5
B. Nabisco Did Not Use the Goldfish as a Trademark
With little analysis, the court ruled Nabisco, if permitted to market its
fish-shaped cracker, would unlawfully trade in on the goodwill of
Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish trademark. However, to be considered a
201. See id. at 217-18.
202. See id. at 221.
203. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
204. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[S]ome
marks, such as COCA-COLA, may be so famous as to be judicially noticed.") (citing 2 JEREMY
GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 5.12[l][c][iii], at 5-267 to 5-268 (1999)).
205. See supra note 38.
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trademark use, the mark must be used for its commercial value.20 6 Yet,
Pepperidge Farm offered no evidence that Nabisco attempted to use its
cracker in such a way.207
As illustrated from the facts, it is difficult to conclude that Nabisco
attempted to capitalize on Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish trademark.208
Rather, under a contractual obligation to Nickelodeon, Nabisco was
required to produce a cracker closely associated with the CatDog Cartoon
character.209 In accordance with the cartoon, the Dog-half of the CatDog
character preferred bones as its favorite food and the Cat-half fancied fish
as its favorite meal. Nabisco's production of fish-shaped crackers was not
trademark related because Nabisco was trading on the value of a fish shape
and not on the goodwill of Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish cracker.
C. Functionality
The purpose of the functionality rule is to "prevent the grant of
perpetual monopoly by the issuance of a trade-mark in the situation where
a patent has either expired, or for one reason or another, cannot be
granted. "2 0 In Nabisco, the goldfish shape of a cracker is functional and
thus cannot be protected under the FTDA. The fish shape connotes an
essential commercial value that cannot be monopolized.2 "
In Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc.,212 Judge Leval
wrote:
It is a fundamental principle... that, although trademark rights
may be acquired in a word or image.., the acquisition of such
206. See Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998). InPanavision, the Ninth
Circuit determined whether the defendants "attempt[ed] to sell the trademarks themselves." Id.
207. See generally Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208.
208. See id. at 212-13.
209. See id. at 213.
210. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 732 (3rd Cir. 1957);
see also Beth F. Dumas, Comment, The Functionality Doctrine in Trade Dress and Copyright
Infringement Actions: A Call for Clarification, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 479 (1990)
("The functionality doctrine prevents the otherwise inevitable clash between free competition and
trademark protection that occurs when trade dress protection is extended beyond a product's
packaging to its design.").
211. Even if Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish could receive a patent on the design of the fish,
that time is now long overdue. A design patent only lasts a maximum of twenty years; the
Goldfish is thirty-seven years old. See supra text accompanying note 6.
212. 70 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 1995). In Car-Freshner, the defendant used the shape of a pine
tree to produce air fresheners that plugged into electrical outlets. See id. at 268. The plaintiff
sold pine-tree-shaped air fresheners made of flat scented cardboard with a string attached to the
top of the tree, so that they can be hung from the rear-view mirror of a car. See id.
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rights will not prevent others from using the word or image in
good faith in its descriptive sense, and not as a trademark ....
What matters is whether the defendant is using the protected
word or image descriptively, and not as a mark.213
In acknowledging the public's right to use words and images trumps a
markholder's right to exclusivity,214 Judge Leval held the defendant's pine-
tree shaped air fresheners did not violate the plaintiff's trademark rights in
its pine-tree shaped air fresheners.21 s
In Nabisco, the shape of Nabisco's goldfish cracker is essential to the
product itself. Nabisco used the goldfish shape solely to portray the
preferred meal of the Cat-half of the CatDog creature. Nabisco used a fish
shape for its natural descriptive qualities which are of nontrademark value.
Moreover, Nabisco's fish-shaped crackers are packaged in boxes indicating
that "'CatDog and related titles, logos and characters are trademarks"' of
Nickelodeon.216 This fact further strengthens the argument that Nabisco
did not intentionally attempt to sell its fish-shaped cracker by trading in on
the goodwill of Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish.
In Car-Freshner, Judge Leval explicitly referred to the importance of
a product's packaging in deciding whether a trademark had been used for a
nontrademark use.2 17 Judge Leval made three basic findings in determining
the defendant used the mark as a nontrademark.2u8 First, there was no
indication the defendant used the shape of its product as a trademark.219
Second, the defendant's product came in boxes that prominently bore the
defendant's trademark name as well as the parent company's corporate
logo. 220 Third, each unit had the defendant's name imprinted across the
213. Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,
64 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1995); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4,
12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Holzwarth v. Hulse, 14 N.Y.S.2d 181, 181 (Sup. Ct. 1939); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 66, § 28; MARGRETH BARRETr, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 760-61 (1995); 3A
RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §
21.24, at 211-217 (4th ed. 1983).
214. See Car-Freshner, 70 F.3d at 269.
215. See id. at 270.
216. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213.
217. See Car-Freshner, 70 F.3d at 270.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
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front of the product itself.22' However, Judge Leval did not use his Car-
Freshner analysis in Nabisco.222
In Nabisco, Judge Leval did not apply the Car-Freshner test to find
Nabisco's product had wholly distinctive packaging. If Judge Leval had
applied the Car-Freshner test to Nabisco, the first two prongs would have
been satisfied. First, there is no indication Nabisco traded upon the
goodwill of the Goldfish cracker by attempting to use their fish-shaped
CatDog product as a trademark. Second, Nabisco's crackers come in boxes
prominently bearing Nickelodeon's trademarked name CatDog, as well as
the Nabisco name and brand logo. The third Car-Freshner prong is not
met because of its practical unfeasibility. It would be too burdensome, if
not impossible, to require that each cracker bear the name "Nickelodeon."
D. Proposal: Testing for Good Faith and Predatory Intent
Evidence of either good faith or predatory intent is not listed among
the FTDA's famousness factors.223 Yet, the FTDA provides for injunctive
relief as the sole remedy unless the alleged dilutor "willfully intended to
trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. 224
Hence, it is implicit that bad faith and/or predatory intent are specific
aggravating factors in a federal dilution law cause of action.
In Car-Freshner, Judge Leval held that the public's interest in using
descriptive words or images in good faith must trump any exclusivity claim
by the markholder because the trademark owner assumed the risk when
selecting a mark with descriptive attributes. 225 Thus, Judge Leval should
have held Nabisco merely "use[d] a protected mark to describe aspects of
[its] own goods.., in good faith and not as a mark."
226
The Second Circuit correctly found Nabisco possessed no predatory
intent.227  Predatory intent refers to a junior user's attempts to profit
commercially by associating itself with an established senior mark.
228
221. See id.
222. See Nabisco, 191 F.3dat215.
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. TV 1998).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) ("If such willful intent is proven, the owner of
the famous mark shall also be entitled to [attorneys fees and monetary damages].").
225. See Car-Freshner, 70 F.3d at 269-70 (citing Dowbrands, L.P. v. Helene Curtis, Inc.,
863 F. Supp. 963,966-69 (D. Minn. 1994)).
226. See id. at 270 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (1994)).
227. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 225-26.
228. See id. (citing Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 188, 206 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026, 1037 (2d
Cir. 1989))).
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Although Nabisco undoubtedly knew of Pepperidge Farm's success in
marketing a fish-shaped cracker, that knowledge is insufficient to show bad
faith.229 The Second Circuit's holding of no predatory intent only bolsters
the claim that Nabisco's use of a goldfish-shaped cracker was not for the
purpose of capitalizing on Pepperidge Farm's trademark.
Courts should grant more weight to bad faith and predatory intent
when deciding dilution actions. Before enjoining a defendant from
producing a similar product, the court should ask a series of questions: Did
the defendant copy the plaintiff's mark, or are the marks substantially
similar? If so, would other marks have satisfied the defendant's good faith
need to produce a particular shape?
In applying this test to the facts of Nabisco, we would find the shape
of Nabisco's fish would probably be considered substantially similar
although Nabisco's cracker is larger, flatter and has markings on one side.
The second prong would uncover the true reason Nabisco used a fish
shape: Nabisco could not have otherwise satisfied its need to produce a
cracker that was strongly associated with the favorite meal of the cat-half
of the CatDog creature.
Nabisco's cracker resulted from a functional necessity of a legitimate
endeavor for a nontrademark use. In effect, enjoining Nabisco only allows
Pepperidge Farm to potentially secure a permanent design patent for a fish-
shaped cracker, creating a perpetual monopoly unprecedented in traditional
intellectual property law.
V. CONCLUSION
Through its interpretation of the FTDA, the Second Circuit in
Nabisco has substantially furthered the transformation of dilution law into a
right in gross, akin to copyright or patent law, 230 allowing trademark
owners the unprecedented possibility of perpetual and exclusive rights over
the shape of certain marks. There is an inherent problem in providing
Pepperidge Farm with this type of patent-like protection over the shape of a
fish. As the legislative history maintains, and case law suggests, anti-
dilution was not intended to give a perpetual monopoly over common
words and generically shaped products. Rather, the law was intended to
protect famous marks from exploitation by others.
229. See United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 199 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
230. See Moskin, supra note 14.
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Under the Second Circuit's interpretation, dilution law may become
an overreaching reconstruction of trademark law. As a result, dilution law
may become completely altered, losing its historical purpose of preventing
junior uses of senior marks on dissimilar products or services.
2 3 1
In the short period since the enactment of the FTDA, dilution law has
quickly changed from an appendix of trademark law into an ever-
encompassing catchall legal claim. As a result, the more logical and
limited trademark infringement law falls by the wayside. Until courts
clearly define and reasonably interpret the concept of dilution, there is little
hope for uniformity and even less hope the FTDA will fairly grant
nationwide legal refuge to only the most famous of marks.
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